Update: January 5, 2026
Yemen: The Battle for Hadramawt Reshapes the Gulf Influence Map
Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces have regained control of Mukalla, the strategic capital of Hadramawt province, following intense clashes with UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces. This came in the wake of military escalation that began in December 2025, when the STC seized large parts of Hadramawt and al-Mahra, igniting a diplomatic crisis between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Saudi Call for Dialogue: In a diplomatic move to contain the escalation, the Saudi Foreign Ministry announced on January 3, 2026, its welcome of a request by Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council President Rashad al-Alimi to hold a “comprehensive conference in Riyadh bringing together all southern factions to discuss just solutions to the southern issue.” Saudi Arabia called on all southern parties to participate “to develop a comprehensive vision that fulfills the legitimate aspirations of the southern people.”
The Southern Transitional Council welcomed the Saudi initiative, describing it as a “genuine opportunity for serious dialogue,” but imposed conditions including international guarantees, a clear timeline, and recognition of the right to self-determination through a popular referendum. To date, Saudi authorities have not announced a specific date for the conference or the list of invitees.
The Saudi call received widespread regional and international welcome, with Qatar, Bahrain, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation praising it as a necessary step to restore dialogue in the south and address the southern issue within a comprehensive national and regional framework.
Background to the Conflict: Hadramawt is a vital region due to its coastal location on the Arabian Sea and its oil wealth, in addition to Mukalla port, which represents a major commercial gateway. After the STC seized control of the region in December, government forces launched a large-scale military operation with Saudi air support that began on January 2, resulting in the deaths of 20 people in strikes on al-Khasha camp in Hadramawt, according to the STC. The operation led to the recapture of Seiyun on January 3 and Mukalla the following day, forcing a complete withdrawal of Emirati forces from Yemen, according to a UAE Defense Ministry announcement on January 3.
Parties Involved:
- Yemeni Government Forces: Internationally recognized, receiving direct Saudi military and logistical support
- Southern Transitional Council: A separatist faction seeking to restore the state of South Yemen through a referendum after a two-year transitional period, backed by the UAE
- Arab Coalition: Led by Saudi Arabia, facing internal rifts due to divergent agendas
- Houthis: Monitoring developments from the north without direct intervention, benefiting from their adversaries’ preoccupation
Humanitarian Consequences: The fighting has displaced thousands of families from Mukalla and its surroundings, disrupting humanitarian aid access. The UN warned that a 75% funding shortfall threatens a humanitarian catastrophe, especially with disrupted food supply lines. Flights from Aden International Airport have been suspended since January 2, with both sides exchanging accusations about responsibility for the airspace closure. On Socotra island, dozens of foreign tourists are stranded after ports and airports were closed due to the security escalation.
Regional Dimensions: The conflict reveals the depth of the Saudi-Emirati disagreement over Yemen’s future. Riyadh accused Abu Dhabi of arming the STC and pushing it to seize Hadramawt and al-Mahra in December, which the UAE denied while affirming its commitment to Saudi security. Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on December 30 targeting two Emirati ships in Mukalla port, claiming they were transporting weapons and armored vehicles to the STC without permits.
The Yemeni government announced the termination of its joint defense agreement with the UAE, demanding all Emirati forces withdraw within 24 hours, and imposed a 90-day state of emergency with a three-day closure of all land, sea, and air entry points. Abu Dhabi responded by withdrawing all its forces on January 3, announcing “the conclusion of its counterterrorism forces’ presence” and its commitment to “dialogue and de-escalation.”
This division may weaken the coalition that was formed primarily to confront the Iranian-backed Houthis. Tehran is watching these developments cautiously, fearing strengthened Saudi control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, one of the world’s most important waterways connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.
What to Watch:
Developments in the economic crisis with the collapse of the Yemeni rial and potential widespread famine
Somalia: Israeli Recognition Crisis Threatens National Unity
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud categorically rejected Israel’s recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland, describing the move as a “flagrant violation of national sovereignty” and warning that it is part of a broader regional scheme to resettle Palestinians in the Horn of Africa. This position came amid massive protests in Mogadishu, at a time when Somalia assumes the presidency of the UN Security Council for January 2026.
Roots of the Crisis: Israel announced its recognition of Somaliland as an independent state in late December 2025, an unprecedented move that sparked outrage in Mogadishu. This recognition comes after years of undeclared relations between Tel Aviv and Hargeisa (capital of Somaliland), which included security cooperation and investments in the strategic port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. The port is viewed as a vital access point to the Red Sea and an important trade route connecting Africa to the Middle East and Asia.
Political and Historical Context: The Somaliland region has considered itself an independent state since 1991, following the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime and its emergence from the Somali civil war. The region established its own government, parliament, and currency, but has not received international recognition despite its relative stability compared to the rest of Somalia. Somalia is currently experiencing acute internal political tension with the approaching presidential elections originally scheduled for January 20, 2026, with the opposition demanding a comprehensive national conference before this date to avoid a constitutional crisis that could lead to a dangerous political vacuum.
Somali Government Position: President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud considered the Israeli recognition a “hostile act” aimed at dividing Somalia and weakening its national unity. The Somali president linked the recognition to alleged Israeli schemes to resettle Palestinians in the Horn of Africa, a claim Israel rejected and described as “conspiracy theory.” The Somali president called on the international community to reject this recognition and stand with Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Massive protests erupted in Mogadishu on January 3 and 4, with thousands of Somalis demonstrating against the Israeli recognition, raising banners affirming Somali unity and rejecting the “Zionist conspiracy.” Somali authorities closed several main streets in the capital to accommodate demonstrators, in a scene reflecting the sensitivity of the national issue.
War Against Al-Shabaab: Simultaneously with the political crisis, Somali forces, with support from African Union forces and American drone strikes, continue their military operations against the Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al-Shabaab. The Somali army announced the killing of more than 50 militants from the movement in military operations in Lower Shabelle and Middle Juba states during January 2-4. The operations targeted training camps and hideouts for the movement, with confiscation of quantities of weapons and ammunition.
However, Al-Shabaab still controls vast areas in the Somali countryside, especially in the center and south of the country, and launches periodic attacks in the capital Mogadishu. On December 30, 2025, the movement carried out a car bomb attack near the Somali intelligence headquarters in Mogadishu, resulting in the deaths of 12 people and injuring more than 30 others. Security analysts fear the movement may exploit current political divisions to expand its influence and intensify its attacks.
Regional Dimensions: Ethiopia: Has security and economic agreements with Somaliland for decades, including a controversial agreement signed in January 2024 granting Addis Ababa access to Berbera port in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland. The Israeli recognition puts Ethiopia in an awkward position vis-à-vis Mogadishu, especially with existing tensions over the Renaissance Dam and water issues.
China: A high-level Chinese delegation visit to Somalia is expected in mid-January, as part of competition for influence with the West in the Horn of Africa. Beijing seeks to strengthen its investments in Somali ports as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, and may exploit the crisis to present itself as a reliable alternative to Western partners.
UAE: Has huge investments in Berbera port worth over $440 million through DP World, complicating its position on the crisis. Abu Dhabi is trying to maintain balanced relations with both Mogadishu and Hargeisa, but the Israeli recognition increases the difficulty of this balance.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia: Concerned about Israeli expansion in the region and its impact on Red Sea security and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Cairo is particularly worried about any regional arrangements that might affect its water security or strengthen Israeli influence in the Nile sources.
Somalia’s Role in the Security Council: Somalia assumes the presidency of the UN Security Council during January 2026, a rare opportunity for Somalia to highlight its issues and priorities. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced he will use this platform to pressure Israel and mobilize international support to reject recognition of Somaliland. Somalia is expected to present a draft resolution condemning the Israeli recognition, despite the likelihood of the United States using its veto in favor of Israel.
Security Challenges: Analysts fear Al-Shabaab may exploit current political divisions to expand its influence and intensify its attacks. The movement, which seeks to overthrow the federal government and establish an Islamic emirate, has previously exploited political crises to recruit new fighters and control additional areas. Also, the government’s distraction between confronting the security threat and addressing the political crisis may weaken the effectiveness of the military campaign against the movement.
Electoral Crisis: Somalia faces a potential constitutional crisis with the approach of elections on January 20 without clear political consensus. Opposition parties demand postponement of elections until a comprehensive national conference is held to resolve disputes over the electoral system and candidate eligibility. Observers fear failure to reach agreement may lead to a constitutional vacuum that could ignite widespread security disturbances, especially with the legal expiration of the current president’s term.
What to Watch:
- International reactions to the Israeli recognition, especially from the African Union, Arab League, and United Nations
- Somalia’s exploitation of its Security Council presidency to pressure Israel and possibility of presenting a condemnation resolution
- Results of the anticipated Chinese visit and the volume of investments and support provided
- Success of military operations against Al-Shabaab and their impact on security stability
- Possibility of reaching electoral consensus before the January 20 deadline to avoid constitutional crisis
- Ethiopia’s position on the Israeli recognition and its impact on Somali-Ethiopian relations
- Potential escalation by Al-Shabaab of its attacks exploiting political divisions
Libya: The Street Imposes Its Pressure on the Political Class
Massive demonstrations broke out in the capital Tripoli and several Libyan cities on January 2 in front of the UN Support Mission in Libya headquarters, demanding acceleration of presidential and parliamentary elections that have been postponed since December 2021. This popular movement comes at a time when the UN supports local mediation to resolve the dispute over the Constitutional Court, amid announcement of an energy and economy summit in late January aimed at attracting foreign investment and reviving the struggling economy.
Roots of the Crisis: Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011 following a popular uprising within what became known as the “Arab Spring,” Libya has experienced chronic division between two rival governments: the Government of National Unity in Tripoli (west) led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, and the Libyan interim government in Bayda (east) backed by Marshal Khalifa Haftar. All international and regional initiatives have failed to unify institutions and end this division that has exhausted the country economically and security-wise.
Elections were supposed to be held on December 24, 2021, under a political agreement sponsored by the UN reached at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Geneva. However, deep disagreements over the electoral law, the constitutional basis, and eligibility of some controversial candidates (especially Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of the former Libyan leader, and Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the military commander in the east) led to their postponement indefinitely.
Demonstrators’ Demands: Thousands of Libyans from various cities participated in demonstrations, raising slogans demanding:
- Holding presidential and parliamentary elections by April 2026 at the latest
- Dissolving the High National Elections Commission and replacing it with a neutral and credible one
- Ending institutional division between east and west Libya and unifying sovereign institutions
- Holding accountable those responsible for postponing the democratic process and wasting public money
- Stopping foreign interference in Libyan internal affairs
The demonstrations saw notable participation from youth and women, in a scene reflecting growing frustration with the continuing political vacuum and deteriorating living conditions. Security forces dealt with demonstrations with relative restraint, with some limited friction incidents in Benghazi where dozens of demonstrators were detained for a short period.
UN Role: The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), led by the new UN envoy, is trying to facilitate dialogue between Libyan parties to rebuild trust in the electoral process. UN mediation focuses on three main axes:
First: Reaching a consensual formula for a new electoral law that gains acceptance from all parties, while addressing contentious issues such as conditions for presidential candidacy and mechanisms for appealing election results.
Second: Resolving the dispute over the Supreme Constitutional Court, where two governments dispute the legitimacy of its formation and headquarters (Tripoli or Bayda). This dispute blocks any legal path to approving a permanent constitution or ruling on the constitutionality of electoral laws.
Third: Unifying sovereign institutions, especially the Central Bank of Libya and the National Oil Corporation, which suffer from administrative division affecting management and distribution of oil revenues.
However, past experience raises pessimism about the success of these efforts, given each party’s insistence on its position and the influence of regional and international powers supporting each side.
Economic Dimension: The “Libya Energy and Economy Summit” is scheduled to be held January 24-26 in Tripoli, with expected participation from international oil companies and foreign investors. The summit aims to:
- Attract foreign investment to Libya’s struggling energy sector
- Reduce gas flaring associated with oil production through liquefaction and gas investment projects
- Rehabilitate oil infrastructure damaged by civil war
- Explore cooperation opportunities in renewable energy
- Examine mechanisms to improve transparency in managing oil revenues
Libya has the largest proven oil reserves in Africa (48.4 billion barrels), but political division and armed conflicts have led to a sharp decline in production from 1.6 million barrels per day before 2011 to an average ranging between 1.0-1.2 million barrels currently. Also, mismanagement of revenues and widespread corruption have exacerbated the economic crisis despite the huge oil wealth.
Regional and International Complexities: Egypt and Turkey: Support rival parties, with Cairo openly supporting Haftar and the eastern government, while Ankara supports the Government of National Unity in Tripoli militarily and logistically. Turkey signed controversial security and maritime agreements with the Government of Unity in 2019, which angered Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus.
Russia: Has tangible military presence in eastern Libya through the Wagner Group (which was restructured under the name “Africa Corps” after Prigozhin’s rebellion in 2023). Russian forces control the strategic Al-Jufra air base in central Libya, giving it a foothold in the Mediterranean.
Italy and France: Concerned about the flow of irregular migrants through Libyan territory to European shores. Libya is considered the main transit point for hundreds of thousands of African migrants annually, making its stability a European priority. However, Italy and France also support different parties in the Libyan conflict, complicating the situation.
United States: Interested in preventing Libya from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, which exploited chaos to expand in the past. Washington supports the UN political track and tries to limit growing Russian influence.
UAE and Saudi Arabia: Supported Haftar in his military campaign on Tripoli (2019-2020), but withdrew after its failure. Currently they adopt a more neutral position while maintaining relations with both parties.
Potential Risks: Political analysts warn of several dangerous scenarios:
First: Continuation of the political vacuum may lead to comprehensive national collapse, especially with growing conflicts over control of oil revenues among armed factions in the west.
Second: Exacerbation of the economic crisis with declining Libyan dinar value and rising inflation rates, increasing citizens’ suffering and fueling popular anger.
Third: Return of large-scale civil war if political efforts fail, especially with accumulation of weapons and militias in all areas.
Fourth: Increasing foreign influence at the expense of national sovereignty, with Libya’s transformation into a proxy battleground between regional and international powers.
What to Watch:
- Developments in Libyan mediation under UN supervision and possibility of reaching consensus on electoral law
- Results of the Energy and Economy Summit (January 24-26) and its ability to attract actual investments
- Continuation of popular movement and its pressure on the political class to hold elections
- Position of regional and international powers on popular pressure and their readiness to pressure their allies
- Potential for new military escalation if political tracks falter
- National Oil Corporation’s ability to maintain production levels amid division
- Developments in the Constitutional Court dispute and possibility of resolving it
- Effectiveness of new UN mediation after failure of previous attempts
Sudan: Escalating Humanitarian Catastrophe and Battles Threaten Infrastructure
More than 100 people were killed in scattered attacks launched by the Rapid Support Forces on cities and displaced persons camps in the Western Darfur region during the first days of January, while the Sudanese army repelled a drone attack targeting Merowe Dam, the country’s largest hydroelectric project and one of the most important dams on the Nile River. The war ongoing since April 2023 between the army led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces led by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” continues, in a bloody conflict that has become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis currently.
Situation in Darfur: The cities of El Geneina (capital of West Darfur state), Nyala (capital of South Darfur state), and Zalingei (capital of Central Darfur state) witnessed a new wave of brutal violence during January 1-4. Attacks included random artillery shelling of residential neighborhoods, ground attacks on displaced persons camps, and widespread looting.
In El Geneina, reports from local relief organizations indicated the deaths of at least 47 people, mostly civilians, in shelling that targeted the main market and Kreinik camp for displaced persons. Eyewitnesses described horrific scenes of bodies scattered in the streets, with ambulance crews unable to reach the injured due to continued fighting.
In Nyala, 35 people were killed in scattered attacks including heavy artillery shelling on southern neighborhoods of the city, where army forces are stationed. The city, considered the second largest in Darfur, has been under suffocating siege by RSF forces for months, leading to acute shortages of food and medicine.
In Zalingei, 25 were killed in violent clashes on the city’s outskirts, with reports of RSF forces using civilians as human shields in some areas.
Targeting Merowe Dam: In a dangerous development, the Sudanese army announced foiling a drone attack on Merowe Dam in the Northern State on the morning of January 3. Air defense systems fired at three drones, two of which were shot down before reaching the dam, while the third fell into the Nile without causing damage.
Merowe Dam, which opened in 2009, produces more than 50% of electricity in Sudan with a capacity of 1,250 megawatts, and is considered a lifeline for millions. Its targeting reflects the RSF strategy of hitting vital infrastructure to weaken the army. The army accused the UAE of supplying RSF with drones, an accusation Abu Dhabi categorically denied.
Displacement in Kordofan: In North and South Kordofan states (western Sudan), renewed battles between the army and RSF led to the displacement of more than 65,000 people during the first week of January alone. Most of the displaced headed toward the cities of El Obeid and Dilling, which already suffer from enormous pressure on their resources due to hosting hundreds of thousands of displaced persons since the war began.
UN reports spoke of horrific conditions in displacement camps, where the displaced lack the most basic necessities of life: clean drinking water, food, shelter, and healthcare. With the arrival of the cold season, thousands of children and elderly face the danger of death from cold and diseases.
The Kordofan region is vital for containing important oil fields, especially in Heglig on the border with South Sudan. Control of this region means controlling oil revenues necessary to finance the war effort, which explains the ferocity of the fighting.
Humanitarian Crisis: The numbers reveal the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan:
- 12 million displaced: including 8 million within Sudan and 4 million who took refuge in neighboring countries (Egypt, Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia)
- 30 million people: in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, approximately half of Sudan’s population
- More than 150,000 killed: since the start of the war in April 2023, according to estimates from human rights organizations (official figures are much lower)
- 750,000 people: facing famine risk in Darfur and other areas
- 70% of hospitals: out of service due to shelling, looting, or lack of supplies
Health System Collapse: The Sudanese health system is in near-total collapse. In Khartoum, only two out of 20 government hospitals are functioning. In Darfur, basic healthcare has completely disappeared in most areas, with the spread of diseases such as cholera, malaria, and measles.
The crisis was exacerbated by acute shortages of essential medicines and vaccines, with most pharmacies closed. Pregnant women and children are the most affected, with maternal and child mortality rates rising to unprecedented levels.
Cultural Heritage Theft: In an unfortunate development, reports indicated the theft of hundreds of rare artifacts from the National Museum of Sudan in Khartoum, which houses treasures from Nubian and Kushite civilizations, some dating back thousands of years. The museum was looted during battles in the capital, with the disappearance of priceless pieces representing Sudan’s ancient history.
Dozens of archaeological sites in northern Sudan were also destroyed, including the Pyramids of Begrawiya (Meroe), a UNESCO World Heritage site. Some of these sites were used as military positions, exposing them to shelling and destruction.
Imminent Famine: International relief organizations warned that Sudan is heading toward the worst famine in its modern history. In Darfur specifically, the World Food Programme announced that 750,000 people are in “famine” state (Phase 5 – the most dangerous in food security classification), with expectations that the number will reach more than 2 million by mid-2026 if conditions do not improve.
The causes are multiple: disruption of agricultural production due to war, destruction of food stocks, difficulty in delivering aid, and collapse of local markets. The main planting season (June-September) was severely affected last year, meaning scarcity of 2026 crops.
Regional Dimensions: Chad: Has received more than 1.5 million Sudanese refugees, putting enormous pressure on its limited resources. There are fears of the conflict extending across borders, especially with tribal interconnections between Darfur and eastern Chad.
Egypt: Hosts more than one million Sudanese, most of whom entered on tourist visas and settled in Cairo and Alexandria. Cairo is concerned about the continuation of chaos in Sudan and its impact on its national security, especially regarding Nile waters.
Ethiopia and Eritrea: Accused of supporting different parties in the conflict, complicating the regional scene. Ethiopia, preoccupied with its internal conflicts, tries to maintain relative neutrality, while reports accuse Eritrea of providing corridors for arms smuggling.
South Sudan: Suffers from refugee influx despite its already difficult humanitarian conditions. The halt of Sudanese oil pumping through its territory due to the war negatively affected its economy.
Gulf states: The UAE is accused by the Sudanese army of supporting RSF with weapons and funding, which Abu Dhabi denies. Saudi Arabia is trying mediation but with limited success.
Failed Peace Attempts: Multiple mediation attempts have failed to stop the war:
- Jeddah: Saudi Arabia and the United States hosted dialogue rounds in May and June 2023, but they collapsed due to ceasefire violations
- Cairo: An Egyptian initiative in July 2023 did not gain RSF acceptance
- Addis Ababa: An IGAD (East African states organization) attempt in August 2023 stopped due to procedural disputes
- Nairobi: An African initiative in October 2023 did not launch at all
The main obstacle is the lack of seriousness of both parties in negotiation, with each party believing in the possibility of military resolution. Also, contradictory external interventions complicate any peace efforts.
What to Watch:
- Any potential peace talks, especially with new African or Arab mediation
- The ability of humanitarian organizations to flow aid, especially to the besieged Darfur
- Developments in battles in Darfur, Khartoum, and Kordofan, and the possibility of military resolution for either party
- Potential targeting of vital infrastructure (dams, power stations, airports)
- Development of the humanitarian crisis and famine warnings, while monitoring mortality rates
- International position on imposing effective sanctions or an arms embargo on both parties
- The possibility of international peacekeeping forces’ intervention or delivering aid
- Impact of war on neighboring countries and regional stability as a whole
- Fate of missing and abducted persons, especially women and children
- Potential for Sudan’s disintegration or division if the war continues
