When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in direct retaliation for the American-Israeli strikes on its territory that began on February 28, 2026, it did not merely shut down a maritime corridor — it laid bare a deep strategic fracture between the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council: those who want Iran confronted and weakened, and those who want it engaged and contained. Gulf states had no seat at the table when Washington and Tel Aviv made the decision to strike — yet all six found themselves in the line of fire. All six scrambled their air defenses. Yet when it came to the question that mattered most — what to do about Iran, who should do it, and at what price — they could not agree on a single answer.
Three Camps, Not One
Even as Iranian missiles and drones crossed their skies, the six Gulf states did not converge around a shared view of Iran, a common reading of the war, or a preferred outcome. The crisis has revealed three clearly distinct camps.
Camp One: The UAE and Bahrain — Rupture and Confrontation
The UAE closed its embassy in Tehran and withdrew its ambassador along with every member of its diplomatic mission — a complete severing of diplomatic ties, not merely a formal protest. Abu Dhabi was the first state to describe Iranian officials’ conduct as “terrorism,” and Iran’s blockade of Hormuz as “economic terrorism.” It openly declared its readiness to join military efforts against Tehran, grounding this position in the imperative to restore deterrence through deeper cooperation with Washington and Tel Aviv.
Bahrain, for its part, drafted a UN Security Council resolution that in its original form invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and called for reopening the strait by “all necessary means,” including the use of force. After the text was progressively softened under pressure from several Council members, the resolution was vetoed by Russia and China. The entire episode revealed that Bahrain’s geopolitical reading has now moved closer to the UAE’s position than to Saudi Arabia’s.
Camp Two: Qatar and Oman — De-escalation and Engagement
In the wake of the Iranian attacks, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi declared that “our neutrality stands for the cause of peace — it is the cornerstone of our national security and our unique gift to the world.” Muscat has remained committed to its mediation and engagement approach with Tehran, arguing that this diplomatic positioning has measurably reduced the scale of attacks on its territory compared to its neighbors.
While missiles were still falling, Qatar’s deputy foreign minister said that “the total annihilation of Iran is not an option,” adding: “We will live side by side, and we must find ways to coexist.” Doha had also informed Washington of its refusal to allow Al Udeid Air Base to serve as a launchpad for operations against Iran — before the war even began.
Camp Three: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait — Strategic Hedging and Deliberate Ambiguity
Saudi Arabia positioned itself squarely between the two camps: it did not call for the continuation of the war as the UAE and Bahrain did, nor did it announce active engagement with Iran as Oman and Qatar have. It permitted the United States to use its bases, but refrained from directly responding to Iranian strikes. Most significantly, the Kingdom is working to leverage the internal divergence rather than choose between its poles — treating Emirati pragmatism and Omani diplomatic positioning as complementary assets rather than contradictions.
Kuwait, for its part, has adopted a posture of “quiet neutrality” rooted in hard geographic and political realities: it shares direct borders with both Iran and Iraq, hosts major U.S. military bases that made it an actual target of Iranian missiles, yet its political leadership has clung firmly to a language of de-escalation and a refusal to slide toward confrontation. This has manifested in a careful Kuwaiti effort to avoid any statement that could be read as an invitation to escalate — while simultaneously maintaining security coordination with Washington at the operational level, well away from the political spotlight.
Hormuz — The Arena of Open Division
The question of how to reopen the strait is where theoretical disagreement hardens into direct practical conflict. The UAE and Bahrain advocate for forcible reopening if necessary, under a U.S.-led coalition. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, by contrast, joined the France-and-UK-led “coalition of the willing for Hormuz” at the ministerial and diplomatic levels — a framework that envisions a purely defensive operation to be implemented only after a potential ceasefire.
This split does not reflect a technical disagreement over reopening mechanisms. It reveals fundamentally different conceptions of the Iranian threat itself: is Iran an existential enemy to be neutralized by force, as the UAE believes? Or a permanent neighbor to be managed diplomatically, as Oman maintains?
The most dangerous consequence of this division is that it is effectively prolonging the closure itself. The absence of a unified Gulf position makes it difficult for Washington and other negotiating parties to engage with the GCC as a single actor capable of making and honoring commitments. The closure validated Saudi and Emirati investments in bypass pipelines and triggered logistical partnerships — including a Dammam-Sharjah trade corridor — and rail projects like the Emirati-Omani Hafeet Rail initiative are advancing. But these are all unilateral adaptation tracks, reflecting individual crisis management rather than collective solidarity.
Adding further complexity, Iran has repeatedly deployed an “open-then-close” tactic: in April 2026, it announced the reopening of the strait only to reimpose restrictions within twenty-four hours, while attacks on oil tankers continued. This maneuver makes clear that Tehran is treating Hormuz as a negotiating lever, not a purely security measure. The idea that control over Hormuz constitutes a powerful strategic deterrent has become a recurring theme in Iranian policy circles, with a common refrain that had Iran played this card earlier, it would never have faced sanctions or war.
Tensions with Washington — Shared Anger, Different Choices
Most official Gulf statements direct their anger at Iran — but there is an equally visible frustration with the United States and Israel for launching the war without notifying Gulf states or accounting for their security. The difference is in how each state channels that frustration:
- The UAE has doubled down on its ties with Washington and Tel Aviv, treating normalization with Israel as irreversible.
- Oman and its officials sharply criticized Israeli influence and U.S. policy, describing regional parties unwilling to criticize Washington as evading their responsibilities.
- Qatar publicly called for Al Udeid not to be used in the strikes, and affirmed that normalization with Israel is a red line.
- Saudi Arabia remained the most ambiguous, while its commentators criticized Emirati trade with Iran that ultimately failed to restrain Tehran.
These divisions explain the GCC’s absence from the negotiating table. The Council holds no seat in the talks despite repeated appeals — the very talks that will shape the region’s economic and security environment for years to come.
Assessment — Flexible Cohesion or Structural Fracture?
The Gulf division over Iran and Hormuz is not an emergency created by the war — it is an entrenched structure that the war has exposed. Three axes define this split:
- The first axis: whether Iran is an existential threat to be neutralized or a permanent strategic neighbor to be managed.
- The second axis: attitudes toward the U.S. and Israeli military presence and the domestic political costs it imposes on Gulf governments.
- The third axis: how to reopen Hormuz, and whether military intervention is a legitimate and necessary option.
Saudi Arabia — by virtue of its weight and its centrist positioning — will need to construct a Gulf security framework that brings member states together behind a maritime security agreement with Iran, ensuring that U.S. bases on Saudi soil are not used for future strikes against Iran, in exchange for guarantees that Saudi territory will not be targeted. This is a long and complex path, but it is today the only realistic option available to a bloc paying the price of strategic incoherence.
What the Hormuz crisis ultimately reveals is this: the Gulf cannot manage the Iran file with six separate foreign policies, in a world where adversaries and allies alike negotiate with one actor — not with six divergent visions.