News: In a serious security development, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has re-emerged publicly in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen — the first clear indication of its activity since Saudi-backed forces took control of the area in early January 2026, following operations that targeted southern counterterrorism forces. Local sources circulated footage of armed AQAP members exchanging Eid al-Fitr congratulations on March 20–21, 2026. Yemeni observers linked this resurgence to the security vacuum left by the gradual withdrawal of UAE forces and the dismantling of the elite force structure that Abu Dhabi had carefully built. The intensity of AQAP operations against Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces in the rugged Mudiyah district has escalated, signaling a shift from defense to offense. Meanwhile, the forces that replaced the UAE’s direct field presence — fragmented by competing loyalties and agendas — have failed to fill the security gaps that UAE-trained elite units had maintained for years. (Step News, 25.03.2026)
Background: AQAP’s resurgence in southern Yemen is closely tied to the post-UAE-withdrawal phase, which accelerated at the end of 2025 and culminated in December when the UAE Ministry of Defense announced the termination of its remaining counterterrorism units in Yemen — following Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi’s cancellation of the joint defense agreement with Abu Dhabi. The UAE’s reduced presence exposed the security architecture it had painstakingly built over years across Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadhramaut — an architecture built on UAE-trained local elite forces and the Security Belt, underpinned by a sophisticated tribal intelligence network. Once that cover receded, vast security vacuums emerged in remote areas, which AQAP exploited to reorganize and expand its presence.
Causes: The security model the UAE established in southern Yemen rested on three integrated pillars: local forces (the Security Belt, Shabwani and Hadhramaut Elite Forces), direct UAE logistical and intelligence support, and precise tribal knowledge of the terrain and local actors. When this structure was reshaped by the UAE’s drawdown, local control networks collapsed, security units withdrew or redeployed, and ungoverned gray zones emerged — providing the ideal environment for AQAP’s movements.
The Shabwani Elite Forces, centered in Shabwa governorate, were established primarily to secure oil, gas, and economic infrastructure, while the Hadhramaut Elite Forces were tasked with protecting ports and coastal areas — both serving as a critical deterrent against terrorist movements. Yet UAE direct support was the backbone of both units’ effectiveness.
The internal conflict has allowed AQAP to rebuild its networks in the remote deserts and valleys of Hadhramaut and Shabwa, using the chaos as cover for its operations. Should al-Mahra and the Hadhramaut valley slide into guerrilla warfare and targeted assassinations, they risk becoming new centers of extremist activity. The absence of the UAE security umbrella has also fueled conflict between the STC, Saudi-backed forces, and tribal factions — turning AQAP into a beneficiary third party rather than the primary shared target.
Implications: The UAE withdrawal has degraded the regional security architecture Abu Dhabi built through sustained effort, with cascading effects across multiple tracks.
When security collapses, smuggling networks emerge, informal taxation expands, and natural resources are looted — creating an ideal financing environment for AQAP, as previously witnessed when the group controlled al-Mukalla in 2015. A tacit non-aggression arrangement with the Houthis gives AQAP a secure rear base, while enhanced arms-smuggling networks could provide access to new capabilities enabling more sophisticated attacks. AQAP relies on local financing through kidnapping operations and investment via tribal networks in Hadhramaut and Shabwa — networks now subject to far less scrutiny in the absence of UAE intelligence infrastructure. The retreat of UAE-sponsored investment projects in the south, including energy, port, and infrastructure initiatives, deepens the economic crisis and expands AQAP’s recruitment environment among unemployed youth.
Significance for the United States: The UAE served as a pivotal intelligence and security partner for the United States in combating AQAP in Yemen. Washington relied heavily on UAE intelligence and the capabilities of locally trained partners to guide its strikes. The erosion of this role revives the threat of a group that has previously targeted American interests and planned external attacks — at a moment when Washington appears less prepared for direct re-engagement.
Analysts consistently rank AQAP as the most dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate globally, combining an internal insurgency with active planning against Western targets. The group’s threats have historically forced the closure of dozens of American diplomatic facilities across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, and have inspired or directed attacks inside the United States and Europe. In May 2025, the United States conducted a drone strike in Abyan, though a U.S. defense official indicated that Washington had not carried out deliberate strikes since President Trump announced a ceasefire in the air campaign against the Houthis — suggesting reduced counterterrorism pressure against AQAP in the current period.
Future Scenarios: The trajectory in southern Yemen falls along three principal paths.
The first is gradual containment of AQAP — the least likely scenario, as it requires conditions that do not currently exist: either a UAE return in a different form, or Saudi capacity to fill the intelligence and operational vacuum, neither of which has materialized.
The second is a cycle of recurring security crises — the most probable path, in which a familiar pattern repeats: inter-factional conflict generates a security vacuum, AQAP exploits it to return, limited military campaigns weaken it temporarily without addressing root causes, and the cycle begins again.
The third is AQAP’s transformation into a covert network — abandoning direct territorial control in favor of more flexible, harder-to-detect tactics: assassinations, ambushes, and the construction of cross-border networks, capitalizing on the reduced intelligence pressure of the post-UAE-withdrawal era.
Assessment: The UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen has directly contributed to reshaping the security environment in ways that have provided opportunities for AQAP’s resurgence. The UAE was the most effective component of the security architecture in southern Yemen — in terms of training, equipping, intelligence coordination, and the ability to mobilize tribal partners. When that role receded, no alternative force succeeded in compensating for the gaps that emerged.
The vacuum left by the withdrawal was not filled by a coherent structure, but by fragmentation among competing local forces — weakening coordinated counterterrorism efforts and diverting the energy of local actors toward their own internecine conflicts. The result has not been durable stability, but recurring cycles of temporary calm followed by collapse — each time creating space for armed groups to re-establish themselves. Looking at future trajectories, full containment of AQAP remains the least likely scenario absent either a UAE return in any form or the emergence of a genuine security alternative capable of inheriting what Abu Dhabi left behind.