The Issue
Turkish armed forces and the Somali National Army conducted joint airstrikes in the Jowdi area of Lower Shabelle region, targeting caves, weapons depots, and hideouts belonging to al-Shabaab. The official Somali statement reported approximately 35 militants killed and more than 20 wounded. Local and international reports indicated the use of Turkish F-16 fighter jets, with large secondary explosions at the targeted site pointing to the presence of munitions and explosives prepared for planned attacks.
Background
Turkey’s presence in Somalia is not new: since 2017, Ankara has operated the TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu for training Somali forces. In February 2024, the two countries signed a ten-year defense and economic agreement that includes strengthening maritime security and building Somali naval capacity. Turkish Bayraktar drones have been reported in offensive operations against al-Shabaab since 2022. What is new this time is the explicit announcement of joint strikes using F-16 fighter jets — potentially marking the first direct Turkish air intervention at this level.
The strikes came against a backdrop of intensified al-Shabaab activity throughout 2025, with the group recapturing rural areas and small towns and at points approaching Mogadishu’s outskirts, before Turkish, American, Emirati, and African Union force contributions helped contain the advance.
Implications
For the Somali government, the strikes signal that Mogadishu now possesses effective Turkish air support in addition to ground and training assistance — enhancing its capacity to bring the fight to the group’s hideouts and stockpiles before new attacks are launched.
For Turkey, this development marks a qualitative shift in its role: from “training and arming” to direct “operational partnership.” Ankara views Somalia as a strategic gateway to the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and proximity to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, with interests tied to energy, ports, and maritime security in an era of intensifying regional competition.
On the risk side, previous American airstrikes in Somalia generated human rights criticism over civilian casualties and lack of transparency. Should targeting errors recur in Turkish operations, al-Shabaab could exploit them to portray the government and its allies as foreign forces targeting the population — undermining military gains and complicating the domestic political landscape.
Assessment
The Turkish strikes mark a turning point in the nature of the Somalia-Turkey partnership, but they do not by themselves resolve the Somali security equation. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated over many years its ability to regroup and withstand successive military campaigns, because the roots of its resilience are not purely military — they draw sustenance from weak state institutions, tribal divisions, and economic and social grievances that remain unaddressed.
The most likely trajectory is a gradual expansion of Turkish airstrikes if the first operation proves effective without significant political cost, while factoring in that al-Shabaab will seek a retaliatory response to demonstrate its continued capacity. The true measure of success for this intervention will be whether the airstrikes are backed by a political and institutional track that addresses the structural conditions keeping the group alive.
