Riyadh Knocks on Beijing's Door

The News:

China secretly asked Iran to use its influence to rein in the Houthis, in response to a Saudi appeal following the group's rapid advance along the Red Sea coast and around Bab el-Mandeb, according to three Iranian sources who spoke to Reuters on September 17. China's foreign ministry said Beijing does not want tensions to spread to Yemen and the Red Sea.

Background:

Riyadh turned to Beijing after the Houthis seized a strategic stretch of the west coast and defeated Saudi-backed forces, leaving its oil exports and shipping more exposed. It bet on China's relationship with Iran and its channels to the Houthis, and on Beijing's direct interest in the security of energy flowing to Asia.

Causes:

The turn toward China reflects declining Saudi confidence in Washington's willingness to bear the cost of confrontation. According to Axios, President Trump rejected the crown prince's request for direct strikes and offered only intelligence sharing. At the same time, U.S. officials met Houthi representatives in Muscat, and the Houthis assured Washington that their 2025 truce with it still holds and that only Saudi-linked ships are targets. From Riyadh's perspective, this created a security vacuum, so it sought to turn the Houthi threat from a Saudi-American problem into a direct Chinese interest.

Implications:

Riyadh did not turn to China as a substitute for Washington, but as part of a rapid diversification of support channels: Pakistan as a channel to Tehran, security coordination with Pakistan and Turkey through the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement, contacts via U.S. Central Command on Israeli intelligence support, and requests for interceptor aircraft from Egypt and Britain. The Chinese mediation, however, remained limited: Tehran tied regional stability to ending the U.S.-Israeli war against it, and Beijing made no move to apply economic pressure despite being the largest buyer of Iranian oil.

Why It Matters for the United States:

A major security partner turning to a strategic rival in an urgent crisis exposes the widening gap between what Riyadh wants and what Washington provides. It also allows Beijing to convert its economic ties with Saudi Arabia and Iran into political influence on a sensitive file and to repeat its role in the 2023 agreement between the two countries. If it succeeds in restraining the Houthis, a precedent will be set of a Gulf ally turning to Beijing in times of crisis. But China may only contain the escalation temporarily, since lasting calm depends on the course of the war with Iran and on Tehran's and the Houthis' willingness to separate the Yemeni front from it. Moreover, President Trump's hint in October at joining Saudi strikes could reshuffle the cards and reduce Riyadh's need for a Chinese mediator.